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SUMMARY: This article draws attention to the fact, often overlooked, that  innovation 
is not foreign to the history of Indian philosophy. Three such  episodes are briefly dis-
cussed (in reverse chronological order): (1) the innovations introduced by Raghunātha 
and his followers in the Nyāya school of thought (ca. 1500 CE); (2) the innovations that 
gave rise to satkāryavāda, pariṇāmavāda, śūnyavāda, anekāntavāda and other philo-
sophical positions (early centuries CE); (3) the innovations responsible for the first 
manifestations of rational philosophy in India (ca. second century BCE). Raghunātha’s 
innovations are most instructive in that a great deal is known about his  politico-cultural 
surroundings. Lessons drawn from these help us to  understand the beginnings of Indian 
rational philosophy better.
KEYWORDS: innovation, Indian philosophy, Raghunātha, Navadvīpa, satkāryavāda, 
Kathāvatthu, recursive argument method
The history of Indian philosophy has its share of innovations. Its very 
beginning was an innovation of sorts, one to which I will turn at the end 
of this article. Other innovations followed, probably too many to enu-
merate. Some of these were more important, more drastic, than others. 
Among the more drastic ones one might mention the one that gave rise 
to a number of fundamental positions that came to underlie all the dif-
ferent schools of philosophical thought: satkāryavāda, pariṇāmavāda, 
śūnyavāda, anekāntavāda and others; I have dealt with it elsewhere 
(Bronkhorst 2011). Perhaps the most recent important innovation is
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the subject matter of a book by Jonardon Ganeri: The Lost Age of  Reason 
(Ganeri 2011). His discussion of this innovation is of particular interest 
because it is accompanied by an analysis of its socio-political context. 
This analysis will be used later in this article to look at earlier instances 
of innovation in Indian philosophy.
The particular innovation that Ganeri discusses in this book is 
inseparably connected with the name of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, who 
lived approximately from 1460 to 1540 CE. Raghunātha was a  thinker 
in the Navya-Nyāya school of philosophy, but one who distin-
guished himself from most others by questioning the very principles 
of the school he represented. Indeed, Ganeri calls him the first modern 
philosopher, an epithet that he also applies to many of his followers.
What distinguishes Raghunātha from so many other Indian 
philosophers is that we know a fair amount about the circumstances 
of his life. Indeed, Ganeri points out that Raghunātha’s originality 
was not unconnected with these circumstances. He grew up and lived 
in Navadvīpa, a town in Bengal, roughly a hundred kilometres north 
of modern Kolkata. About this town, 
[c]omparison of the historical evidence with the preserved manuscript 
 corpus strongly affirms a correlation between state or royal patronage, 
 political stability, and degree of philosophical activity. Adequate fiscal sup-
port emerges as a crucial determinant of healthy scholarship, patronage that 
came initially from a liberal-Islamic sultanate and later from the regional 
Hindu kingdoms. (Ganeri 2011: 39–40) 
Ganeri informs us of the continued promotion of  Bengali  literature 
and employment of Hindus in key positions under  various 
 sultans in the  fifteenth century, and mentions the year 1493 
in particular: 
In that year, Sultan ‘Alā’-ud-dīn Ḥusayn Shāh (r. 1493–1519),  minister 
to the last Abyssinian king Muẓaffar Shāh, assumes the throne, and thus 
begins a period of rule under which brahminical scholarship flourishes 
and Navadvīpa emerges as the great centre for Navya Nyāya  studies on 
the  Indian subcontinent—the end result of an extended process of  symbiosis 
in which Bengalification of the Islamic ran hand-in-hand with  Islamicization  
of  Bengalis. (ibid.: 41)
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There is reason to think that there is a connection between Raghu-
nātha’s socio-political context and his originality and independence 
as a  philosopher. Ganeri thinks there is, and presents an analysis in 
a  passage that I will quote in full:
Clearly, [Raghunātha] was fortunate in living in a highly accultured city 
at a time of relative calm and surrounded by many sources of intellectual 
inspiration. One text from the period concludes by saying that it was written 
in Navadvīpa in 1494, under the peaceful governance of Majlisavarvaka, 
a place full of learning and learned men.1 Raghunātha, of course, would 
have been among them. On the basis of this document, D. C.  Bhattacharya 
is—and in this he is, regrettably, unique among Navya Nyāya historians—
willing to allow the importance of benign Muslim governance: The histori-
cal importance of this newly discovered information should not be over-
looked. In the cultural history of Bengal, [Raghunātha] Śiromaṇi’s victory 
over Mithilā and his writing the Dīdhiti are unique events, and it is indeed 
interesting information, according to the new evidence, that behind the writ-
ing of the Dīdhiti was the unhesitating inspiration of Muslim kingly power. 
The claim that there was an ‘unhesitating inspiration’ might well be 
an exaggeration, but there is little doubt that during Raghunātha’s lifetime 
Navadvīpa was a place of great scholarship and comparatively peaceful 
Muslim rule. This, though, does not in itself explain his originality, even 
if it is a sine qua non. One further consideration is Raghunātha’s relation-
ship with the scholastic community in Mithilā. Both he, and before him 
his teacher Vāsudeva, went, it seems, to study in Mithilā before returning 
to Navadvīpa. There seems to be a clear sense in which one of the things 
Raghunātha is trying to do is to retrieve Gaṅgeśa from them, to recover 
a thinker lost in the mires of a conservative scholasticism. Another consid-
eration is Raghunātha’s relationship with Vāsudeva, someone who taught 
the convert to Sufism, Sanātana Gosvāmi, the private secretary of Husain 
Shāh, who left Navadvīpa for Orissa, and wrote and taught both Navya 
Nyāya and Vedānta, and was the uncle of the well-connected Vidyānivāsa 
[…] It would have worked to Raghunātha’s advantage that he was not 
himself a member of that powerful family, not having to bear the re-
sponsibility for the family’s prestige and wealth. Being on the periphery, 
he was able to benefit from a close association without the burden. I high-
lighted a  particular intellectual virtue in his work, namely its provocative 
1 In a note, Ganeri refers to Mahādevācārya Siṃha’s  commentary on 
Bhavabhūti’s Mālatīmādhava (Sāhitya Pariṣat Patrikā, p. 245; D. C. Bhattacharya 
1952 [35]) [diacritics corrected].
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 playfulness, its lack of a certain sort of heaviness. I am suggesting that what 
made this possible is his location in the penumbra of scholarly power, nei-
ther too remote nor too close. A final consideration is his exposure to other 
very dynamic and engaging intellectual programmes in a culturally hybrid 
city under the administration of the liberal Husain Shāh. Even if one is 
not inclined towards syncretism or overt dialogue, the existence of alterna-
tive world-views as real lived possibilities exerts its own influence, and not 
stifled in the conservative environment of Mithilā, Raghunātha had options 
the Mithilā scholars did not have. (ibid.: 50–51)
I have quoted this passage at length, because it clearly shows how 
Ganeri—following but also modifying the ideas of Quentin Skinner—
tries to situate philosophical innovation in its socio-political context.
Some of the elements that figure in this passage show up again where 
Ganeri discusses Raghu nātha’s successors (see ibid.: 74, 80–81, 87–88). 
All these passages illustrate Ganeri’s view that
1) Raghunātha and certain of his followers/commentators were 
original and (relatively) independent thinkers.
2) They could be original and independent because they were, 
in some sense, situated in the periphery to established traditional 
thinking.
3) They could, moreover, profit from very dynamic and engaging 
intellectual surroundings.
This last point bears some emphasis. As Ganeri points out: 
It is […] of enormous significance that [the time of Raghunātha and his 
 followers] should be a period of strong Persianate influence and  Islamicate 
power. The problem is to square this fact with another: that one finds very 
few direct traces, if any, of Islamic or Arabic ideas in the work of the  Sanskrit 
philosophers of the time. (ibid.: 7)2
We will refer back to this last sentence later on in this article.
Ganeri’s analysis of the historical situation in which Raghunātha 
and his followers worked makes perfect sense, and raises the 
2 This should not be taken to mean that no Sanskrit texts were produced 
in response to, or even for, the Mughal court; see Truschke 2016: esp. ch. 2.
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question whether there were philosophers before Raghunātha who 
found themselves in similar situations. Was he really the first 
to criticize and depart from the ancients, was he the first innovator? 
And if not, what do we know about the socio-political context of 
other innovators?
Before we turn to these questions, we need to be clear what is 
meant by “modern”. Can only those who live in the “modern period” be 
modern? Can a philosopher who lived in “pre-modern” times, or even 
in ancient times, be modern? Ganeri does not use the term in a chron-
ologically limited sense. Indeed, in another publication he argues 
“that it is better and more correct to think […] of modernity as a  happening 
potentially indigenous to any culture, irrespective of period or place” 
(Ganeri 2013: 349). This means that it is possible to ask whether there 
were modern thinkers before Raghunātha, or even in ancient India.
According to Ganeri, Raghunātha was not the first  innovator. 
However, he may have been the first to criticize and depart from 
the ancients, and therefore the first who was modern. Among inno-
vators preceding Raghunātha, Ganeri mentions Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya 
(14th century) in particular. The innovations in analysis and termino-
logy that we associate with Gaṅgeśa affected far more thinkers than 
those introduced by Raghunātha, because Gaṅgeśa’s innovations 
spread well beyond the limits of one school (Navya-Nyāya) and came 
to be adopted by several others (see, e.g., Bronkhorst, Diaconescu 
and Kulkarni 2013). In spite of this, Gaṇgeśa can be compared with 
Raghunātha and his followers only up to a point. This is how Ganeri 
explains the  difference:
The context of these new philosophers [i.e., Raghunātha and his  followers] 
is […] quite different from an earlier phase of renewal within the tradi-
tion. When Gaṅgeśa writes in the fourteenth century, he is responding to 
a  variety of pressures internal to the Sanskrit world, critiques that had been 
gathering force for some time. (Ganeri 2011: 7–8)
Ganeri then explains what those internal pressures were, and concludes:
[Gaṅgeśa] writes to defend the ancient philosophy from rival critique rather than 
to channel its resources in the project of a new inquiry into the truth as such. (ibid.)
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At the beginning of this article I mentioned the innovation that gave 
rise to satkāryavāda and related currents of thought. This was clearly 
a major innovation in Indian philosophy, one that covered all schools, 
but one that we can, unfortunately, not associate with any single indi-
vidual. Nor are we in a position to say much about the socio-political 
situation in which this innovation arose. What is more, as far as we can 
tell, this innovation, too, responded to pressures internal to the Sanskrit 
world; we have no reason to think that external influence was at work. 
The thinkers involved were presumably not modern in Ganeri’s sense 
of the term.
Ganeri does not mention this innovation. However, in  publications 
that have come out after The Lost Age of Reason, he expresses him-
self on another innovation, viz. the beginning of Indian philosophy. 
Strictly speaking, he claims “that the actual scientific method’s origins 
[…] lie […] in a Buddhist text from Magadha, what is now central- eastern 
India” (Ganeri 2014: 399; my emphasis). Since the text concerned is 
the Kathāvatthu, which is commonly thought of as a philosophical 
text, this can be taken to mean that the origin of Indian philosophy, or 
at least Indian scientific philosophy (in a sense to be considered below), 
is to be looked for in this text. This may be interpreted to imply that 
the Kathāvatthu embodies a fundamental innovation in Indian philo-
sophy, one that presumably introduced an altogether new method and 
might be looked upon as the very beginning of rational philosophy in India.
Ganeri does not stop at this. He also claims “that the Magadha 
Kathāvatthu is the actual origin of scientific method in the medi-
eval world” (Ganeri 2014: 400). Here he draws inspiration from 
a book by Christopher Beckwith that came out in 2012: Warriors 
of the  Cloisters: The Central Asian Origins of Science in the Medieval 
World. We will have occasion to inspect Beckwith’s opinions below. 
Here we note that Beckwith’s arguments are based on what he calls 
the recursive argument method. Ganeri claims that the Kathāvatthu is 
the first text to exhibit such a structure.
Several questions can be raised. In order to support the claim 
that the Kathāvatthu is the first text to exhibit this structure, we need 
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to know its date. According to Ganeri, its author was Tissa Mogaliputta 
(ca. 327–247 BCE), who supervised the Third Buddhist Council, held 
at Pāṭaliputra in 253 BCE (Ganeri 2014: 399). He continues: 
The Council sought to establish concord by resolving disputed questions 
of doctrine between the Sthaviravāda and Sarvāstivāda sects. Mogali-
putta composed a text whose analytical method took as its starting point 
such disputed questions and proceeded in a systematic manner to consider 
the  arguments pro and contra. (ibid.)
To justify these dates, Ganeri says the following in a note: “For  discussion 
of the precise dating of the Kathāvatthu see Charles Willemen, Bart 
Dessein, and Collett Cox, Sarvāstivāda Buddhist Scholasticism 
(Leiden: Brill, 1997); and Akira Hirakawa, A History of Indian Bud­
dhism from Ś[ā]kyamuni to Early Mahāyāna (Hawaii: Univ. of Hawaii 
Press, 1990)” (ibid.: 90–91). Interestingly, the first of these two books 
gives altogether different dates: “the Kathāvatthu, a work that most 
likely dates from the latter half of the second century B.C.”; “Examin-
ing the content of the Kathāvatthu, one comes to realize that the work 
must have been composed more than a hundred years after the time 
of King Aśoka”; “only the most ancient parts of the Kathāvatthu may 
have been composed during the life-time of Aśoka”; “Hirakawa […]: 
‘[…] It is doubtful that Moggaliputta-Tissa wrote the Kathāvatthu 
at this time’”; “If the Kathāvatthu was not composed during the time 
of King Aśoka, one has to reconsider the contention that it was written 
by Tissa Moggaliputta” (Willemen, Dessein, Cox 1997: 17, 58, 59). 
Also Hirakawa is worth quoting: 
Since the Kathāvatthu was compiled within the Theravāda order, some sort 
of council must have been convened. However the council was held not  during 
Aśoka’s reign, but approximately a century after Aśoka. Since the doctrines 
of the various schools of Nikāya Buddhism are examined and criticized 
in the Kathāvatthu, this text must have been compiled after these schools arose, 
probably during the last half of the second century B.C.E. (Hirakawa 1990: 91)
Clearly Ganeri has not checked the publications he refers to.
If, then, the Kathāvatthu belongs to the latter half of the second 
century BCE (rather than to the middle of the third century BCE), it is 
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roughly contemporary with Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya, a  grammatical 
text that uses the recursive argument method, as I pointed out in 
 another publication (Bronkhorst 2016a: 42–43). Both these texts are 
earlier than the Aṣṭagrantha and the Vibhāṣā, the two texts in which 
Beckwith believes to find the earliest expression of the recursive 
argument method.
There is a more serious problem with the Kathāvatthu. This text, 
as I pointed out many years ago (Bronkhorst 1993), is at least in  certain 
cases quite ignorant of the opinions of its adversaries, and ends up 
with arguments that are mere exercises in logic at best, and nonsensi-
cal at worst. As I put it: “No direct confrontation with the  upholders 
of the alternative doctrines, nor indeed any profound knowledge 
of these doctrines is […] to be assumed on the part of the author or 
authors of the original Kathāvatthu” (ibid.: 59). The question is there-
fore: Should we accept that a text that barely (or not at all) knew 
(some of) the positions it was arguing against as representing the ori-
gin of the scientific method in India and beyond and, as I stated above, 
the origin of scientific/rational philosophy in India? This, of course, is 
bizarre.3
There is also a problem with the recursive argument method. 
As Beckwith presents it, it is primarily a stylistic feature, whose 
essence he describes as follows (Beckwith 2012: 89; cp. Bronkhorst 
2016a: 41–42):
I. Argument (the Main Argment, Question, or Topic)
II. Subarguments1 about the Argument
III. Subarguments2 about the Subarguments1 about the Argument
4
3 Ganeri wrote a paper on the Kathāvatthu in 2001, which confirms 
what I observed in 1993, viz. that much of its contents consists of exercises 
in logic, even if, as Ganeri argues, this was not only formal logic. 
4 See also Beckwith 2012: 25–26: “The recursive argument is, mini-
mally, an argument that is disputed by an argument that is disputed by an argu-
ment, or more simply (but in reverse order), an argument about an argument 
about an argument.”
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Even if we assume, for argument’s sake, that Beckwith is right in main-
taining that examples of the recursive argument do not occur in earlier 
texts, whether Buddhist or non-Buddhist, whether Asian or European, 
it will yet be hard to believe that this way of arguing was unknown 
before the Aṣṭagrantha and the Vibhāṣā. Is this stylistic expression 
not simply a literary reflection of oral disputations in which the dif-
ferent participants are given the occasion to present their arguments 
in full and to refute, point by point, those of their opponents? After all, 
the recursive argument “is at heart a way to examine a problem sys-
tematically, logically, and in great detail” (Beckwith 2012: 25). And do 
such oral disputations—systematic, logical, and detailed—not consti-
tute the background against which Gandharan Abhidharma arose and 
could arise? If so, the literary feature to which Beckwith draws atten-
tion is no more and no less than the reflection of the real life situation 
that allowed Gandharan Abhidharma—and not just the Aṣṭagrantha 
and the Vibhāṣā—to arise.5
Richard Salomon, while describing the style of the Kathāvatthu 
and similar texts, comes to the same conclusion, calling it “a discursive 
5 Beckwith emphasizes the difference between structure and content, 
but believes that the former can influence the latter (ibid.: 35–36): “The overt, 
explicit, formal structure of the recursive argument is its most crucial fac-
tor. It is not quite true that ‘the medium is the message’ in recursive method 
books, but because they typically consist exclusively of lists of recursive argu-
ments, each of which contains many contrasting views on the same prob-
lem, they clearly did encourage scepticism and speculation by the authors. 
In that respect, therefore, it is true that the form of the recursive argument did 
have a significant indirect impact on the content of works written according 
to it. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the specific overt structure, per se, 
of a recursive argument is not directly or even implicitly connected, structur-
ally or semantically, to its specific overt content or to the implicit logical struc-
ture of the internal content. In other words, in a recursive argument method, 
the way it is said has essentially nothing to do with what is said. It does, how-
ever, have a great deal to do with the general way the content is approached 
and understood […].”
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written style that grew out of the experiences of oral debate, whereby 
the opponent becomes something of a straw man” (Salomon 2018: 325). 
And Michel Angot, more generally, says the following about the lan-
guage of bhāṣyas: “cette langue du commentaire partage beaucoup de 
traits communs avec la langue des débats” (Angot 2017: 30).
We have seen that the Mahābhāṣya, and probably also 
the Kathāvatthu, are older than the texts mentioned by Beckwith 
(the Aṣṭagrantha and the Vibhāṣā), and that they, too, contain the recur-
sive argument method. If the recursive argument method is no more 
than a stylistic feature inspired by oral disputations that existed before 
and independently of it, the age of these texts is without significance 
for the origin of scientific method. Other traditions may have fol-
lowed the scientific method (whatever that is) without adopting this 
style. The claim that we have to look for the origin of scientific method 
in the Kathāvatthu, or in any other text displaying the recursive argu-
ment method, is therefore based on extremely weak foundations.
There is no need to deal in detail with Beckwith’s claim (accept-
ed by Ganeri) that this particular stylistic feature travelled from Bud-
dhist monasteries in Central Asia, through Islamic colleges (madra­
sas), to end up in the colleges of medieval Western Europe. Alex J. 
Novikoff, author of The Medieval Culture of Disputation (2013), 
makes clear in a review (Novikoff 2014) that Beckwith’s claims can-
not be taken seriously. And this is but one example.6 It hardly mat-
ters. Even if this stylistic feature came to medieval Europe through 
the intermediary of Buddhist monasteries and Islamic colleges, this 
does not mean that the scientific method travelled with it; it certainly 
6 See also Lössl 2016: 39 (“hardly tenable”); Huff 2013: 83 
(an  overstated title that bears little resemblance to the historical record); 
 Saliba 2015: 113 (“because of the zeal for what looks like an ideologi-
cal commitment to make every important idea stem from the Central Asia 
plateau, the book is severely marred by short-sightedness, and more 
 importantly, of ever-so-gently twisting facts to fit into the straight jacket that 
ideologies usually require”). See further Vovin and Sagart 2016.
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does not imply that the scientific method needed the arrival of this 
style to arise. And the claim that it all came from the Kathāvatthu is 
beyond belief.
Ganeri makes no attempt to situate the innovation that he claims 
finds expression in the Kathāvatthu in its socio-political context, as 
he did in the case of Raghunātha and his followers (see above). We 
cannot blame him for this, for we know very little about the socio-
political context of this text. It is true that Ganeri accepts the legendary 
account that links it to a Buddhist council under Aśoka, but we have 
seen that recent scholarship does not agree with this. If it was indeed 
composed in Magadha, as claimed, this does not help us either, for 
(as far as we can judge) Magadha was hardly the place where  intellectual 
revolutions took place at that time.
However, there was another northern region of the Indian 
 subcontinent where social, cultural and political factors did combine 
to give rise to an intellectual revolution. This was Greater Gandhāra, 
in the far north-west. In or around 185 BCE, at the collapse of the  Maurya 
Empire, this region came under Greek political control. Soon after, 
Buddhism, which was strongly present in that region, systematized tra-
ditional thought in a manner that was completely new. It did not claim 
to be new, to be sure. It claimed to present the teaching of the  Buddha, 
but it is more than clear that this new system of thought—the sys-
tem of Abhidharma that is normally associated with the Sarvāstivāda 
school of thought—reinterpreted and modified elements of that teach-
ing to such an extent that it is fair to speak of a radical innovation 
(Bronkhorst 2016b: § III.2&3).
(Interestingly, Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma does not contain  elements 
that have been recognizably borrowed from Greek thought. This reminds 
us of Ganeri’s [Ganeri 2011: 7] observation, cited above, that “one finds 
very few direct traces, if any, of Islamic or Arabic ideas in the work 
of the Sanskrit philosophers of the time [i.e., of Raghunātha and his 
followers]”. It appears that, even at times of intense cultural interac-
tion, neither Islam nor Hellenistic culture determined the shape that 
Indian philosophical thought took under its influence.)
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Let us now recall what was said above, following Ganeri, about 
Raghunātha and his followers:
1) They were original and (relatively) independent thinkers.
2) They could be original and independent because they were, 
in some sense, situated in the periphery to established traditional 
thinking.
3) They could, moreover, profit from very dynamic and engaging 
intellectual surroundings.
The Buddhist thinkers of Greater Gandhāra, too, were original and 
(relatively) independent (point 1). And we may assume that they, 
too, could profit from dynamic and engaging intellectual surround-
ings (point 3), for they were now confronted with Hellenistic culture, 
characterized by intellectual questioning and debate. The fact that their 
political rulers were now Greeks and no longer Mauryas allows us 
to assume that they had lost the intellectual security that Maurya sup-
port may have provided, so that they, too, had become in some sense 
peripheral (point 2).
There is no need to press these points at present. What counts 
is that these developments in Greater Gandhāra deeply influenced 
many if not all later schools of Indian philosophy. They influenced 
the Aṣṭagrantha and the Vibhāṣā—according to Beckwith, early repre-
sentatives of the recursive argument method—but also the Kathāvatthu 
and the Mahābhāṣya (as I have argued in Bronkhorst 2016b: § III.3). 
In other words, the intellectual innovation that is Sarvāstivāda Abhi-
dharma found expression in a number of texts, some of which adopted 
the stylistic feature that Beckwith calls the recursive argument method. 
Since all these texts give expression to an intellectual revolution that 
was based on and inspired by critical debate, it is hardly surprising that 
some of them are presented in a manner in which details of the under-
lying debate shine through, i.e. in the style of the “recursive argument 
method”. However, the texts exhibiting this style do not incorporate 
a new method, different from the ones that do not exhibit this style. 
All these texts are the result of a new method, they can all be taken 
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to present the results of profound rational debates, in which arguments, 
sub-arguments and sub-sub-arguments were discussed, even though 
only some of these texts show the traces of this procedure.
In the Introduction and Conclusion of his The Lost Age of  Reason, 
Ganeri complains about the “standard history” of early modernity, 
which “served to exaggerate and dramatize the differences between 
India and Europe”. He is right in doing so. In his article from 2013 
he argues that we should “think […] of modernity as a happening 
potentially indigenous to any culture, irrespective of period or place” 
(Ganeri 2013:  349). Instead of science, which is often claimed to be 
a European invention, he proposes “well-ordered science”, also called 
“properly functioning inquiry”, which can be found elsewhere, too: 
“the point of departure is to avoid definitions that turn the privileging 
of Europe into a tautology”. We want a “polycentric history of  science”, 
and to arrive at that, “we must begin with a definition that does not 
presume at the outset that science is in essence an originally Euro-
pean practice” (ibid.: 350). One can appreciate Ganeri’s opposition 
to the claim of European primacy, even though his proposition risks 
losing sight of the remarkable and relatively sudden developments that 
 characterize the so-called Scientific Revolution in Europe.7
Against this background, it is curious to notice that Ganeri, in his publica-
tion of 2014, eagerly grasps the opportunity to show that  European science 
really came from India. We have seen that the  arguments supporting this 
claim are extremely weak, and not  worthy of serious attention. Why then 
should a scholar of Ganeri’s competence and stature fall prey to them? 
Is it possible that he has fallen into the same trap as the scholars he crit-
icizes? Those scholars tried to exclude India from the intellectual his-
tory of the world. Does Ganeri take revenge, by claiming that the most 
important source of European intellectual history lay in India? I am 
not in a position to answer these questions, but like to use the occasion 
7 See, e.g., Wootton 2015. No need to specify that the recursive 
argument method plays no role in Wootton’s account.
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to point out that emotional issues can easily blur the vision of even 
exceptional scholars.
Let me emphasize, by way of conclusion, that Indian philosophy 
has a history, that it is more than a list of timeless systems that exist-
ed side by side. In this history innovations and radical revisions took 
place. These innovations and revisions could have multiple causes, 
among them challenges internal to the tradition, confrontation with 
new ideas, and socio-political circumstances and events. Our sources 
do not always allow us to determine which factors played a role in spe-
cific philosophical developments, but recent studies show that more 
can be extracted from the sources than used to be customary. Ganeri’s 
attempts to situate such developments in a broader context cannot but 
be welcomed. However, his work also illustrates the risks that scholars 
of the history of Indian philosophy can be exposed to.
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